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Introduction 
In this chapter, my aim is to explore how a national film 
agency relates to transnational political, economic and 
cultural spaces. To that end, I have drawn on work 
undertaken for a research project that analyses the setting-up 
and eventual closure of the UK Film Council – once 
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intended to be Britain’s leading body for the implementation 
of film policy.1 
To orientate the reader, here is the story in a nutshell. A 
British Labour government launched the Film Council in 
May 2000. It was re-badged as the UK Film Council in 
2003. For just over a decade, the new agency became 
responsible for supporting the film industry and film culture 
in Britain, as well as advising government. The Film 
Council’s mission was to create a ‘self-sustaining’ film 
industry. This was meant to come about through measures 
such as carefully targeted investment in film production, the 
encouragement of inward investment, co-production 
ventures, support for training to secure the British skills 
base, and regional screen development to counter the focus 
on London. In such areas, the Film Council was an 
important intermediary between the film industry and 
government that increasingly came to define itself more as                                                         
1 My thanks go to the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council for 
funding ‘The UK Film Council: A case study of film policy in 
transition’, award number: AH/J000457X/1. The project’s research team 
conducted the interviews with the informants cited below and its 
members are Gillian Doyle (PI), Philip Schlesinger and Raymond Boyle 
(CIs) and Lisa Kelly (Research Associate). I am grateful to the team, 
Dimitris Eleftheriotis,David Martin-Jones, and Richard Paterson for 
their comments.  
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an agent of the latter than the former. In addition to these 
areas, the Council was a key actor in advising government 
on tax breaks intended to encourage film production and 
keep the doors open to Hollywood in the face of 
international competition, and also took a significant 
initiative in encouraging digital distribution and exhibition. 
At launch, the responsible minister, Chris Smith MP, 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, required the 
Film Council to focus on the elusive task of bringing 
‘sustainability’ to the British film industry (cf. Doyle et al.). 
The body had a wide range of responsibilities. Best known, 
perhaps, were the three film support funds that it ran. The 
Development Fund aimed to promote the production of 
screenplays; the New Cinema Fund centered on supporting 
emerging talent; and the Premiere Fund was set up to 
support mainstream popular British films. In a later phase, 
the UK Film Council was also engaged in promoting digital 
distribution and exhibition. In 2010, Jeremy Hunt MP, the 
Conservative Secretary of State in the newly elected 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, 
decided to close down the Film Council. Various reasons 
were given, with savings in public expenditure as part of a 
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‘bonfire of the quangos’ well to the fore. 2  In fact, the 
politics of closure are murky but they need not detain us 
here (cf. Schlesinger, “Creation”). A key outcome of the UK 
Film Council’s demise was that the majority of its staff was 
transferred to carry on its work at the British Film Institute 
(BFI). Founded in 1933, the BFI is the long-established 
body devoted to promoting national film and television 
heritage and culture. In the game of bureaucratic politics, 
initially it was pushed into a subordinate role by the creation 
of the Film Council. However, the BFI emerged from the 
tangle as a victorious survivor.  But the price was its 
changed remit, incorporating much of the UKFC’s previous 
work. 
Why should any of this interest us? There are good 
theoretical reasons, as to why this should be of interest, as 
well as insights to be gained about how film policy works in 
practice. Taking our distance from the institutional detail of 
a British public body, therefore, we might note that the 
‘national’ level offers a well-recognized entry point into the                                                         
2  In British administrative parlance, a ‘quango’ is a quasi-non 
governmental agency. So the ostensible reason for closure was to cut 
bureaucracy and waste and to show that the scale of the state was being 
shrunk. 
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global contexts of production, circulation and consumption 
of film. Nataaa • urovi•ová observes that •the 
‘transnational’ acknowledges the persistent agency of the 
state, in a varying but fundamentally legitimizing 
relationship to the scale of ‘the nation’” (x). Kathleen 
Newman relatedly remarks that “changes in film industries 
and in film style are now understood not merely to be a 
response to national conditions and pressures, but also to 
have, most always, multiple international determinants” 
(4).These comments provide an entrée into a particular 
analytical orientation – that of ‘transnational cinema’. But it 
is less common in film studies for scholars to note how the 
question of transnationalism relates to a debate in sociology 
about the shortcomings of what Ulrich Beck has called 
‘methodological nationalism’. Beck describes this as “the 
claim that ‘modern society’ and ‘modern politics’ can only 
be organized in the form of national states. Society is 
equated with society organized in nationally and territorially 
delimited states” (24). Beck turns that critique into a 
theoretical position, decrying methodological nationalism 
because it “imposes a territorial understanding of society as 
based upon state-constructed and state-controlled borders” 
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(27), in which culture “is understood in terms of self-
enclosed territorially demarcated units” (30).3  
There are two separate, but linked, aspects of this critique. 
First, for the purposes of his polemic, Beck treats a society 
as though it were territorially bounded. In fact, policing the 
confines is conventionally an attribute of states considered 
as sovereign actors, rather than that of nations – which may, 
or may not, coincide with states. The successful hermetic 
sealing-off of cultural boundaries is not the global norm, 
although attempts are regularly made by various states, for 
instance, to control how globally connected communications 
play out within their territories: censoring and regulating the 
Internet is perhaps the prime contemporary instance of this 
stance. Second, Beck also presents cultures as self-enclosed. 
His picture does not reflect either the actual condition of 
most societies and culture or indeed, the practice of 
contemporary social science. Rather it encapsulates the 
belief-system of an outmoded nationalism – the object of his 
attack – and is a straw man. 
Beck’s antidote to this cordon sanitaire conception – which 
encapsulates the worldview of those who lament any cross-                                                        
3  Actually, ‘methodological statism’ would be a better formulation, 
because Beck is really talking about sovereign states.  
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border movement of people, ideas, goods and services – is 
for us to embrace what he calls ‘methodological 
cosmopolitanism’. This is both an outlook and a research 
practice.4 Beck describes it as observing and investigating 
the “boundary-transcending and boundary-effacing 
multiperspectivism of social and political agents through 
very different »lenses•. A single phenomenon, 
transnationality, for example, can, perhaps even must be, 
analysed locally and nationally and transnationally and 
translocally and globally” (82). 
In a cosmopolitan move that broadly fits in with Beck’s 
approach, Tim Bergfelder has also argued for taking the 
transnational dimension seriously, recognizing the 
limitations of thinking of European cinema as a simple 
aggregation of discrete national cinemas. Rather, he 
proposes,that “an alternative history of European cinema 
would […] avoid narratives and discourses of containment, 
replacing these with critical travelogues, charting the 
fluidity of identities, and tracing the brief encounters                                                         
4  Beck has described the ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ as comprising a 
“Global sense, a sense of boundarylessness. An everyday historically 
alert, reflexive awareness of ambivalences in a milieu of blurring 
differentiations and cultural contradictions. It reveals […] the possibility 
of shaping one’s life under conditions of cultural mixture” (3).  
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between films and shifting audience formations” (319). This 
implies that there are versions of ‘Europeanness’ that may 
challenge and overcome fixed conceptions of nationality. Of 
course, this move is subject to many contingencies so a 
historiography of cinema of this kind faces the challenge 
met by all historical revisions. For instance, the present 
economic and political crisis in the European Union, and 
more widely on the continent, has been striking for its anti-
cosmopolitanism, where discourses of territorial 
containment, and challenges to the acceptance of multiform 
identities, have made a come- back. 
In his cosmopolitan zeal, therefore, Beck is too ready to 
dismiss the continuing analytical relevance of researching 
national cultures and states. These still remain relatively 
constraining frameworks, because even if – quite rightly – 
we abandon the exclusive vocabulary of the national for 
analytical purposes, it remains the case that there is an 
international order based on the state system. Any would-be 
cosmopolitan outlook has to negotiate with this reality.  
Moreover, it is crucially important to distinguish between 
nation and state, largely elided by Beck. The state is a 
political formation. Its stability and continuity cannot be 
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taken for granted always and everywhere. Indeed, what is in 
fact the inherently negotiated nature of the state also applies 
to the nation, whether in its formation or its continuing 
boundary-maintenance.  
As it happens, one does not have to espouse methodological 
cosmopolitanism to recognize the shortcomings of 
methodological nationalism. There is no all-or-nothing 
choice to make. Consider, for instance, the difficulties faced 
by those who have pursued a unifying political 
communications process in a common European Union 
(EU) public sphere. When trying to think about a complex 
formation such as the EU it is necessary to conceptualize 
relations between the national and supranational levels of 
government and governance. It is all too clear that the 
supranational dimension does not abolish or transcend the 
national level but rather complexly interacts with it (cf. 
Fossum and Schlesinger). The argument applies equally to 
theories of national cinema, where – however much we 
might stress the transnational dimension of ‘global 
Hollywood’ (cf. Goldsmith, Ward and O’Regan) – we also 
need to recognize the continuing importance of state and 
nation, which are deeply imbricated in the “border-
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circumventing flow resulting from the rapid transformation 
of electronic media and information and communication 
technologies” (Schlesinger, “Scope” 30).  
 
Thinking outwards from the national 
If we were to take Beck’s position, research into the 
formation of a national film agency would appear – at first 
blush – to be firmly locked into methodological nationalism. 
After all, the analysis of the UK Film Council concerns a 
state agency institutionally rooted in the British national 
container. But does this force us into conceptual closure? In 
fact, it does not. Instead, let us pose the question this way: 
how might we think beyond ‘the national’ through the 
national, through the prism of state film policy and its 
ideological legitimations? Specifically, how might film 
agencies such as the UKFC – expressly constituted as 
bastions of the national culture and economy, as state-
created institutions in a world of states – relate to the 
international, the transnational and the global?  
As a first response, let us contrast Beck’s vision of 
multiculturalism and border-transcendent social relations 
with the following, rather baldly instrumentalist statement 
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about ‘Britain and the world’ in A Bigger Picture, the 
official report that in 1998 recommended the creation of the 
UKFC: 
 
[W]e need to create an environment that is 
attractive to foreign investors and supportive of 
British exporters, and to play a leading role in 
the commercial and creative development of the 
European film industry. (Film Policy Review 
Group)  
 
The ‘we’ is the state ostensibly acting for the nation but in 
reality speaking both to, and for, dominant sectors of the 
film industry. As imagined in A Bigger Picture, Britain’s 
place in the world is undoubtedly based in a conception of 
global interconnectedness but those links are presented as 
operating primarily through international trade. Strikingly, 
in light of today’s mounting Euro-skepticism in the UK, the 
quote demonstrates a largely unqualified awareness of 
Britain’s place in Europe that is now hard to find. The 
model of economic connectedness in this official report, 
while central to conceptions of globalization, certainly does 
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not equate to any definition of cosmopolitanism. Its 
internationalist raison d’être is that of building the national 
economy through state intervention and by encouraging the 
competitive behavior of enterprises and individuals.  
From these observations, it is clear that both film agencies 
and film policy are extremely productive sites for 
understanding how national interests are pursued and how 
competitive economic advantage and cross-border cultural 
flows are officially conceived. However, while an agency 
may indeed be located in a specific territory, this does not 
entail a vision of a closed society or economy but instead 
entails a commitment to one that is necessarily open for the 
purpose of doing business. 
In what follows, this essay will illustrate two aspects of the 
UKFC’s transnational orientation. First, by focusing on 
some of its leading figures, we may see how Hollywood 
figured large both in public rhetoric and the value placed by 
government on their actual experience. Second, in a more 
minor key, we can also see how the UK’s membership of 
the EU necessarily required that a European dimension to 
the Film Council’s work be developed.  
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A neat history? 
The creation and destruction of the Film Council were both 
political acts that took place within the longue durée of 
British film policy intervention. British governments have 
devised one or other form of state aid for film production 
since the 1920s. We can point to the existence of exhibition 
quotas back in 1927 – a defense against U.S. imports. The 
same defensive strategy led to the creation of the National 
Film Finance Corporation in 1949 to distribute loans for 
production, and a trade subsidy called the Eady Levy that 
was created in 1950, and later – shifting from voluntary to 
compulsory status – administered by the British Film Fund 
Agency, set up in 1957. A confusing variety of interventions 
followed from 1979 on, including the abolition and re-
creation of support agencies (cf. Dickinson and Street; 
Dickinson and Harvey, “Film”; Hill). Despite party-political 
differences over the precise policies to be pursued by the 
state from time to time, viewed over the long term, these are 
much less significant than the repeated tendency to 
intervene. Subsidies, levies, quotas and tax breaks, in 
various combinations, have been the main economic 
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repertoire available in a longstanding, sporadically pursued, 
defensive strategy towards Hollywood. 
In the UK, political and industry attitudes to the country’s 
undoubted economic and cultural subordination to the U.S. 
film industry are inherently ambiguous. Depending on the 
specific interests involved, Hollywood may be embraced as 
the major source of business for production, exhibition and 
glory for British talent at the BAFTAs and Oscars, or 
instead be seen as a challenge to plural forms of indigenous 
production and distribution.  
Suffice it to say that two interlocking assumptions have 
been in continually shifting inter-relation: first, an emphasis 
on safeguarding national identity through cultural 
expression; and second, a need to keep inventing new forms 
of economic intervention to address the U.S. challenge (cf. 
Magor and Schlesinger). These assumptions are repeatedly 
embodied in policy positions and institutional invention and 
reinvention. The national vantage point is – and always has 
been – deeply imbricated in readings of the global cinema 
marketplace and the soft power and influence afforded by 
cultural relations. 
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From 1995 onwards, shortly before the Film Council was 
set up, a major source of film finance came through the 
National Lottery. James Caterer has noted that “competition 
with Europe seemed to be a prime motivating factor […]” 
(50) for the creation of this funding stream, illustrating that 
– unavoidably – the ‘national’ in film policy is routinely 
conceived relationally, even though Europe is, and has 
been, of secondary importance to the U.S.A. Caterer further 
observed that “building links with Europe or sustaining an 
infrastructure to sustain Hollywood blockbusters were only 
partial solutions to the industry’s difficulties, with the big 
question remaining: what measures could be taken to 
stimulate home-grown film production?” (63). 
Following film producers’ lobbying, in 1997 the Lottery 
allocated significant funding to support the work of three 
‘film franchises’ – Pathé Pictures, the Film Consortium, and 
DNA Films which constituted an attempt to create mini-
studios (cf. Magor and Schlesinger 303-305). The idea was 
to establish stable frameworks for the production, 
distribution and exhibition of slates of films. Vainly as it 
turned out, hopes were invested in the successful vertical 
reintegration of Pathé Pictures, the largest of the franchises, 
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as a counterweight to the U.S. majors (cf. Caterer 64-68). If 
the would-be British studio model was highly under-
capitalized, nevertheless it paid homage to the USA (and the 
EU). 
 
Creating the Film Council 
Rather than pursue a detailed account of how the new 
national agency was created, let us consider the agency of 
some key individuals in the development of the UKFC. 
Building on earlier research into the role of networks of 
expertise, the argument is that a ‘policy generation’, small in 
numbers, with preferred suppliers of ideas, dominated the 
Labour government’s creative economy policy, which 
underpinned developments in film policy (cf. Schlesinger, 
“Creativity”).  
The pursuit of national interests through the mobilization of 
expertise in the policy field may often involve drawing on 
actors whose knowledge and reputation is deeply formed by 
their transnational experience. Because film production is 
so greatly shaped by international business relations, this 
has affected how the UK government has valued certain 
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kinds of knowledge and that in turn proved significant for 
how the new agency was formed.  
Moving back to the specifics of the case, in 1997 the Labour 
government’s Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, mobilized 
expertise by setting up the Film Policy Review Group 
(FPRG). This task force produced A Bigger Picture, the 
report already mentioned, whose key recommendation was 
to set up a new national film agency. The FPRG’s co-
chairman was Stewart Till, President of International, 
PolyGram Filmed Entertainment (then part of Philips, the 
Dutch multi-national corporation). Till personally embodied 
a rather short-lived European attempt to set up a studio on 
the Hollywood model.  
He had emerged as a key industry player in the policy field 
earlier in the 1990s, alongside former Columbia Pictures 
CEO, David Puttnam, producer, inter alia, of Chariots of 
Fire (1981) and The Killing Fields (1984). Puttnam was 
actively involved both in background discussion of policy 
matters and in giving advice on the allocation of Arts 
Council film funding in the 1990s. Indeed Puttnam’s policy 
influence under New Labour extended across several fields. 
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In 1997, Puttnam, in terms redolent of successive post-war 
French governments, as well as the leadership of the EU at 
that time, sounded the alarm-bell of cultural and industrial 
war with the USA, arguing that it is “frankly dangerous to 
allow Hollywood’s extraordinary dominance in the field of 
filmed entertainment” (349). Noting the interconnections 
between Hollywood and Washington and how this sold both 
values and goods, he advocated a similar posture for the UK 
and the European Union. His intervention was completely 
aligned with Labour’s thinking on the creative industries: 
“the distinguishing characteristics of any nation or 
community today lie in the quality of its intellectual 
property” (353) 5  It was time, he maintained, to exploit 
Europe’s cultural assets as part of a global economic 
struggle. 
As his position chimed with Chris Smith’s views, Puttnam’s 
views carried considerable weight in his background 
discussions with the Culture Secretary. According to 
informed sources interviewed for this project, Puttnam 
influenced the appointment of key players to the new Film 
Council’s board of directors. Moreover, two of David                                                         
5 The foundational document, published in 1998, is that of the Creative 
Industries Task Force. 
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Puttnam’s close advisers supported work for the FPRG, and 
later continued to exercise major influence in policy-making 
circles.6 We were reliably informed that it was Puttnam who 
recommended Stewart Till as co-chair of the film policy 
review to Chris Smith, who described his choice – and how 
these things are done – as follows: “I hosted a reception for 
the British film industry and I met with a lot of the key 
players at that time. I decided to establish the Film Policy 
Review Group and to ask Stewart Till to chair it, and I 
announced that at the [Cannes] Film Festival [1997]” 
(UKFC Project Research Team, “Chris Smith”).  
When the new body was launched in May 2000, it was 
intended to draw together all major public funding for film 
and also to operate at the heart of film strategy. The 1998 
Film Policy Review recommended the “[r]ationalisation of 
Government machinery in the longer term”, the principal 
aim being to “provide strategic leadership for the film 
industry and a clearer focus on its development” (Film 
Policy Review Group 50).  
The underlying logic of rationalization involved coupling a 
critique of the existing agency landscape with reforms that                                                         
6 These were John Newbigin, then a key policy adviser at the DCMS, 
and Neil Watson, who became main strategy adviser at the UKFC.   
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sought to simplify its workings. The pursuit of ‘coherence’, 
of one national roof, meant that the previous patchwork 
funding arrangement was necessarily found wanting. The 
creation of the Film Council – while sweeping up smaller 
bodies 7  – had left the BFI largely untouched, and the 
cultural and educational remits were sub-contracted to the 
older body. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith has argued – plausibly – 
that new Labour strategy “really was about the creative 
industries […] Given that focus, it was never likely that that 
the BFI, whose interests were, in the eyes of the 
modernisers, positively antiquarian, could be put at the 
centre of a strategy whose main aim was the development of 
a sustainable domestic film industry with that of film culture 
firmly in second place” (300).  
As it transpired, the BFI’s continued existence proved to be 
significant for how the Film Council operated during its 
lifespan and also for film policy, after its demise. The 
formation of the Film Council was not without critics. For 
instance, Margaret Dickinson and Sylvia Harvey criticized                                                         
7 Aside from funding the BFI and in practice controlling its board-level 
appointments, the new Film Council incorporated the British Film 
Commission, the BFI Production Department, British Screen Finance 
and the Arts Council of England’s Lottery Film Department. 
 21 
the closed process by which it was established and, 
pertinently for the present analysis, also noted the 
“relatively limited range of interests represented on its 
governing body” (“Film Policy” 425) as well as the Film 
Council’s non-statutory status (cf. Dickinson and Harvey 
“Public Policy”). From a sociological point of view, the 
matter is not just about which interests were represented but 
also how those interests were legitimized by government to 
serve its purposes by officially recognizing one particular 
form of expertise to the relative exclusion of others.  
Operating alongside the logic of rationalization, therefore, 
was the logic of expertise. Expertise – in practice – was 
identified as residing with those who agreed with the new 
project, rather than drawing on the gamut of possible expert 
opinion. Needless to say, whether the right kinds of experts 
were chosen became one of the continuing critical lines of 
debate about the Film Council. But that is less interesting 
for present purposes than how some key figures were seen 
by the Labour government to straddle the national and the 
global and therefore fit in with the FPRG’s objectives. 
The role of key players such as David Puttnam and Stewart 
Till may be productively analyzed by using Pierre 
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Bourdieu’s conception of how a habitus shapes its 
inhabitants. As Bourdieu put it, this leads us to “insist on the 
generative capacities of dispositions, it being understood 
that these are acquired, socially constituted dispositions” 
whose •»creative•, active, inventive capacity […is] that of 
an acting agent” (13).   
The mobilization of pertinent expertise occurs in the 
following way. Given individuals’ immersion in the 
business of making films comes to be valued by policy 
makers by virtue of their prominence and also their 
connections with those in power and their advisers. They are 
then selected as key actors to implement policy, and asked 
to apply their learned practices and modes of thought to the 
operations of an agency such as the UKFC, itself an 
officially created collective agent with an expert national 
mission.  
Once the idea of the UKFC had been endorsed by an official 
report evidently set up precisely to being about that 
outcome, the Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, had to decide 
who would run it (cf. Schlesinger “Creation”). We were 
reliably told that he had privately identified the 
outstandingly successful British film director, Alan Parker, 
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as the man for the job. Parker had two Best Director 
nominations, for Midnight Express (1978) and Mississippi 
Burning (1988), as well as being noted for directing Bugsy 
Malone (1976) and Fame (1980) and much else besides. He 
was a highly credible figure in Hollywood.  
At the time that the Film Council was being launched, 
Parker was Chairman of the BFI. Smith and Parker had also 
identified the BFI’s then Director, John Woodward, as the 
person to be the Film Council’s new CEO. Previously, 
Woodward had been Director of the Producers Association 
for Cinema and Television (PACT). Thus, in an unusual act 
of decapitation, the BFI lost its two leading lights to the new 
organization, to which it became subordinate. 
Woodward’s own credibility and expertise were different 
from Parker’s. At Smith’s request, PACT had commissioned 
a consultancy report, submitted in September 1997 (cf. 
Hydra Associates). This reviewed “potential structures of 
government support” for the UK film industry. A producer-
focused inquiry, it found considerable doubts among 
producers about the possibility of a single or dominant 
funding agency for film, although this was still one of the 
options mooted.  
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Hollywood to the fore 
In 2002, two years into his chairmanship – and by now 
endowed with the knightly title, Sir Alan – Parker gave a 
crucial, and controversial, chairman’s speech in which he 
set out his views on the future of the UK film industry. As 
an exemplary credo of one schooled in a Hollywood 
entertainment habitus, through whose eyes the limitations of 
British national cinema are seen, it could hardly be bettered: 
 
The basic truth of the film industry is that it is a 
distribution-led business […]. The formula used 
now by Hollywood is exactly the same as it has 
been for 80 years. […] Make nomistake, 
international distribution is where the real 
money is made in the film industry. […] We 
need to abandon forever the “Little England” 
vision of a UK industry comprised of small 
British film companies delivering parochial 
British films. […] We need to stimulate the 
growth of an industry that embraces the 
international market. […] This means 
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reinventing the UK as a “film hub” – a creative 
core. A film hub which is a natural destination 
for international investment. (Parker 6-9, 
emphasis in original)  
 
This line was just a further elaboration of the UKFC’s 
established strategy of trying to change producers’ 
expectations about the purposes of film funding. Just a few 
months after the Film Council’s launch, in response to a 
journalist’s question as to why ‘mainly big budget films’ 
were now central to film finance, the CEO, John 
Woodward, had replied:  
 
Because it’s pointless to go on handing out 
thousands of small amounts of money to small 
films that will struggle to find a distributor and 
be seen in cinemas. Because there is always a 
bigger chance of getting a return on an 
investment in a higher-budget film. Big films 
are more likely to go wide and repay the money 
put into them, it’s as simple as that. (Poirier 1)  
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In 2004, Till succeeded Parker as chairman for five years. 
After concluding the FPRG’s work, he had been appointed 
deputy chairman of the Film Council, along with Alan 
Parker. In the course of giving evidence to a parliamentary 
committee, he described how his PolyGram experience had 
affected his outlook on the lack of companies of scale in the 
British film industry: 
 
We had a company called PolyGram. I was the 
Head of International at that company. We were 
set up in 1992. Up to the year 2000, we made 
films like Four Weddings and a Funeral and 
Notting Hill, and set up distribution in 13 
different countries including North America. We 
were unfortunate. We were bought by Seagram, 
who wanted to merge PolyGram Records and 
MCA Records, and were a casualty of that 
takeover. Speaking personally, if there is one 
thing that the British film industry could benefit 
from, I would argue that it is a British-based 
mini Hollywood studio that had a worldwide 
distribution capability. However, that is not 
 27 
within the remit of the Film Council. (Till 23, 
emphasis added)  
 
In 2009, Till was succeeded by Tim Bevan, of Working 
Title Films – a one-time subsidiary of PolyGram Filmed 
Entertainment that was then taken over by Universal 
Studios. In Michael Wayne’s phrase, with this third key 
chairmanship, the ‘Atlanticist paradigm’ regarding British 
film policy remained in play (cf. Wayne). Bevan’s track 
record had already been extraordinary, including such high-
grossing films such as Four Weddings and Funeral (1994) 
and Notting Hill (1999). He had sat on the Film Council’s 
inaugural board, but had only a short period to make his 
mark as chairman before the Film Council was axed in 
2010. Imbued with a strong sense of Hollywood’s financial 
and structural advantages relative to the UK film industry, 
he noted pertinentlythat “It’s important to have public 
money going into films, because otherwise you don’t have a 
film industry, basically” (UKFC Research Project Team 
“Tim Bevan”).   
 
Europe, in a minor key 
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Although the Hollywood entertainment habitus was 
dominant among the Film Council’s originators and leading 
figures, the agency was also inescapably embedded in 
relations with Europe – and from early on.  
Because the UK is a member state of the European Union, 
the Film Council could hardly be indifferent to this political 
positioning. In May 2002, the CEO, John Woodward, 
initiated the setting up of a network of European Film 
Agency Directors (EFAD), together with his French 
counterpart, David Kessler, then Director-General of the 
Centre national de la cinématographie (CNC). This 
grouping became a durable lobby, embracing all the EU’s 
member states, whose key objective was to become an 
interlocutor of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. Thus, for instance, in a ‘common declaration’ 
EFAD reaffirmed “the necessity for greater clarity, 
coherence and certainty in the rules drawn up by the 
European Commission that govern public funding” (1). A 
particular concern was the role of state aid in sustaining 
feature film markets in Europe as well as maintaining 
diversity of expression. The UKFC was keen to ensure that 
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the UK became the European center for global film activity 
(cf. UK Film Council, European Strategy). 
The UKFC also established a MEDIA Programme desk, in 
order to benefit from the support for distributing co-
productions that this EU funding source provided. MEDIA’s 
main objectives were to circulate diverse European works in 
the EU and to reinforce the competitiveness of the EU’s 
audiovisual sector. In fact, EU audiovisual policy 
developments were routinely on the Film Council’s agenda 
through the work of its European Strategy Group, although 
some close to the action thought it remained a low priority 
(UKFC Project Research Team, “Jonathan Davis”).8  
Throughout its life, the UKFC was involved in making 
submissions either solely or with other agencies to the 
European Commission, notably in relation to state aid for 
the film sector. But it also lobbied across the whole range of 
the EU’s policy initiatives such as the MEDIA programme’s 
budget, digitization of cinemas, the agenda for culture in a 
globalizing world, creative content online, copyright and 
internet safety. While these concerns were not at the heart of 
the UKFC’s strategy, once again it is clear that alongside the                                                         
8 In 2009, the UKFC spent three and a half times more on its L.A. Desk 
than its MEDIA Desk. See UK Film Council, Scenario Planning. 
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route to Los Angeles there was also another road that led 
directly to the heartlands of European policy-making in 
Brussels. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that a national film agency can be an 
excellent vantage point for thinking about cinema in a 
transnational context. The idea that the national space is a 
self-contained enclosure and that its study is limited by 
‘methodological nationalism’ is confuted by this analysis. 
From the very start, the UK’s national film policy has been 
deeply affected by its location in the international 
marketplace for film, being shaped by attempted, and 
repeatedly failed, competition with Hollywood before 
coming to rest in a subordinate role in the “new 
international cultural division of labor” (Miller). Being a 
member state of the European Union also defined positions 
taken and strategies pursued. It was unavoidably the case 
that the new national body’s institutional form and rationale 
would be shaped by trans-border relations. And, as there is 
no more telling way of trying to steer an agency than 
through the actions and beliefs of key individuals, the 
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UKFC leadership’s immersion in the Hollywood 
entertainment habitus was a key consideration for a 
government intent on capturing the magical know-how 
needed to secure global success. Whether it can be deemed 
to have succeeded is quite another story. 
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